

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

30 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT: Review of DCID 1/20 "Hazardous Areas" ☐

25X1

1. ☐ Pursuant to our charter, the 24 April 1980 meeting of the Compartmentation Subcommittee was devoted to reviewing the current listing of "Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment are Considered to be a Hazardous Activity" appended to DCID 1/20. The following countries/areas were collectively discussed:

25X1

2. ☐ After considerable discussion, the following countries were approved by majority voice vote for addition to the DCID 1/20 listing:

☐

These countries were determined to have pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet governments, to be somewhat unstable, and to be presently experiencing internal security problems. To a greater or lesser extent, hostile intelligence services are freely operating in these areas and pose a threat to SCI knowledgeable persons.

25X1

3. ☐ The members also recommended by majority voice vote that

☐ be deleted from the DCID 1/20 listing. The members noted that these islands have rarely been visited by SCI-indoctrinated persons and that any visitation must be done with the specific approval and under auspices of, ☐

4. ☐ The members again discussed the basic concept of DCID 1/20 which provides that before a country/area can be listed as "hazardous," there must be a risk of harassment, provocation, entrap-

☐ CLASSIFIED BY: DCID 1/20
REVIEW ON: 30 April 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1-011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ment, or detention of US personnel. The current world situation has produced a variety of countries where such a "risk of harassment" has not yet been proven, but in which there is reasonable cause to suspect that such may well be the case. Case in point would be several of the countries mentioned in paragraph 2, above. The members recommended that two listings be included in DCID 1/20. One listing would reflect those countries (e. g., Bloc Countries) in which there was a proven risk and for which specific SIO approval would be required prior to unofficial travel thereto. The second listing would reflect those countries in which the risk was not yet specifically proven, but which was suspect. In the latter case, current DCID 1/20 procedures would apply (e. g., defensive security briefing, etc). As this concept would require a revision to the basic DCID 1/20, I believe it would be best to surface it at the next meeting of the SECOM. If the SECOM agrees with this adjustment of the basic DCID 1/20 policy, the Subcommittee will prepare a draft revision of DCID 1/20 for SECOM review/approval. In any event, we urge early action on the recommendations made in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

25X1

USAF

Chairman, DCI SECOM
Compartmentation Subcommittee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~